36-072 (8) (d) There would be derogation from the zoning ordinance ' s
intent which is to restrict professional offices from
residential districts , even though this particular office
would not necessarily pose problems for surrounding pro-
perties.
Mr. Dragon found that:
(a) The petitioners ' claim that there is a hardship with
respect to this property is groundless. The fact that a
stream bisects the land is not an insurmountable engineer-
ing problem, and therefore, the parcel is usable for the
purposes for which it has been zoned.
(b) Desirable relief could be granted without substantial
detriment to the public good.
(c) The use would derogate from the intent of the zoning ordi-
nance because a professional office is not allowed in this
particular district.
Based on these findings , the Board then voted unanimously to
deny the variance, and the meeting was adjourned at 7:50 PM.
Present and voting were Charles W. Dragon, Chairman, Thomas
Brushway, and Raymond Capers, Associate. Also present was Clare
Fennessey, Clerk.
Charles '7,' Dragon
Chairman
2 -
' C :T H'.}:PTON 7?0O D OF APPEALS /1c. �4
n on :.nnlicaticn of
Thomas and Lillian Miranda
December 13, 1977
The meeting to decide on the application of Thomas and Lillian
Miranda for a variance to use a portion of their home for a law
office was called to order at 7: 30 PM in the Hearing Room, City Hall ,
by the Chairman, Charles W. Dragon.
The public hearing on the matter was held on November 30, 1977 ,
and had been advertised in the Daily Hampshire Gazette on November 14
and November 21 . The minutes of the public hearing were read and
approved unanimously.
Mr. Capers made the following findings:
( a) The applicants purchased the property knowing that the
land was subject to the Wetlands Act. The fact that pro-
fessional people cannot use their homes for offices is not
a basis for hardship, and in this particular case, the
petitioners have other potential sources of revenue,
namely, an apartment which is now rented, a stable which
presently boards nine horses, and land suitable for agri-
cultural purposes.
(b) While relief could be granted without detriment to the
public good, granting the variance would derogate from the
intent of the zoning ordinance.
Mr. Brusliway found that:
(a) The property' s location in a wetlands area is not unique
to this particular parcel . The petitioners ' claim that
the Wetlands Act precludes building an access road to 182
acres, thereby making this portion of the land inaccessible,
is inaccurate. The Wetlands Act does require a hearing
before the Conservation Commission in order to control
certain uses , but will not prevent construction of the
access road.
(b) Regarding hardship, the property had previously been used
for agricultural purposes , a use which is still allowed
by right under the present zoning ordinance. A number of
other uses for this property are also allowed by special
permit, therefore, denial of the request for a professional
office would cause no hardship to the petitioners.
(c) Allowing the proposed use would not be detrimental to the
public good because there would be no appreciable increase
in trC5fic, nor would there be extensive changes to the
building.